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Abstract. This conceptual paper describes world-systems theory that is a socioeconomic and 
political approach that explains the economic development and dynamics of capitalistic 
world economy. In particular, this study clarifies international market trade, economic 
division of labor and other relationships between core and periphery areas. Some limitations 
of this approach conclude this study. 
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1. Introduction 
allerstein (1974) suggests a world-systems theory that investigates the 
economic development of nations in order to create an alternative 
approach with theories of modernization (Rostow, 1960; Seymour Lipset, 
1955; cf., Skocpol, 1977, p.1075). This theoretical paradigm by Wallerstein (1974) 
rejects the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis, that all countries can follow only 
a single path of development and that poor countries can rely on exports to develop. 
The theoretical background of the world-systems theory by Wallerstein (1972, 1974) 
is the Annales School, Marx studies and dependence theory. The Annales school is 
an historical approach and Wallerstein’s theory accepts some concepts, such as 
geoeconomic regions as units of analysis and reliance on empirical and historical 
materials (Braudel, 1994, 1996). Wallerstein (1972, 1974) considers from Marx’s 
studies the centrality of the capital accumulation (a commercial asset value that is 
used by capitalists to obtain additional value, i.e., surplus-value) and competitive 
class struggles. World-systems theory is also based on dependency theory that 
focuses on core-periphery geoeconomic relations (Chirot & Hall, 1982). The 
international-dependence models consider developing countries in a relationship of 
dependence with rich countries (Coccia, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 
2011, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2015, 2015a, 2017, 2017a, 2018, 2018a, 
2018b; Coccia & Benati, 2018; Coccia & Bellitto, 2018; Coccia & Cadario, 2014; 
Coccia & Rolfo, 2010; Coccia et al., 2015). In particular, these international-
dependence models show the power imbalances between rich and poor countries (cf., 
Lewellen, 1995; Todaro & Smith, 2003). Moreover, Wallerstein’s approach is 
affected by Schumpeter (1911, 1942) with his theory of business cycle, the role of 
markets driven by innovations and other driving forces of liberal capitalist 
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development (cf., Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995). Figure 1 shows some differences 
between modernization and world-systems theory.  
 
 
Figure 1. Modernization theory vs. World-systems theory of development 
 
2. World-systems theory: An approach to explain capitalistic 
systems 
Wallerstein (1974, p.374) states that: "a world-system is a social system, one that 
has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its 
life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it 
apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the 
characteristics of an organism, in that is has a lifespan over which its characteristics 
change in some respects and remain stable in others…Life within it is largely self-
contained, and the dynamics of its development are largely internal". In the world-
systems theory by Wallerstein (1974) a vital concept is "world economy" integrated 
through the market, rather than a political center, in which two or more regions have 
geoeconomic interaction with respect to necessities like food, natural resources, and 
protection (Goldfrank, 2000). 
Wallerstein (1974) endeavors to explain the capitalist world economy. In 
particular, Wallerstein (1974, p. 347) considers a theory of social change based on 
a:  "social system… largely self-contained entity whose developmental dynamics are 
largely internal”. Wallerstein (1974) also argues that world markets are based on an 
economic division of labor, in particular, a: "multicultural territorial division of labor 
in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary 
for the everyday life of its inhabitants." This division of labor refers to the forces and 
relations of production of the world economy as a whole and it leads to the existence 
of two interdependent regions, which have different culture and geoeconomic 
location: core region focuses on capital-intensive production, whereas periphery 
region is based on labor-intensive one (Goldfrank, 2000). Semi-peripheral states act 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 5(4), M. Coccia, p.459-465. 
461 
461 
as a buffer zone between core and periphery, and have a mix of activities and 
institutions (Skocpol, 1977). The dynamics of world system generates an unequal 
exchange, which is due to the systematic transfer of surplus from traditional sectors 
in the periphery to the high-technology and industrialized sectors in the core region 
(Goldfrank, 2000)1. This process leads to a capital accumulation at a global scale, 
and involves the appropriation and transformation of peripheral surplus. In short, the 
world system has a power hierarchy between core and periphery, in which powerful 
and wealthy “core” societies dominate and exploit weak and poor “peripheral” 
societies (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2.  Aspects of the interaction between core and periphery within world-systems theory 
 
According to Wallerstein (1974), the history has had two types of large-scale 
social systems: (1) empires with a functional economic division of labor and an 
approach of tribute-collecting imperial state, and (2) world economies with multiple 
political sovereignties, no one of which can control the entire economic system. A 
world economy should be more able than a world empire to sustain economic 
development because economic subjects have more freedom to maneuver, 
appropriate and reinvest economic resources and surplus. This world economy, such 
as capitalism from the sixteenth century to the present, has a division of labor among 
three regions (core, semiperiphery, and periphery) linked together by a world trade 
market in bulk commodities (necessities for consumption of population). Each 
geoeconomic region of the world economy has an economic structure based on a 
mixture of economic activities (e.g., industry and products from multi-cultivation in 
agriculture within core areas; products from mono-cultivation in periphery areas) 
and labor control (e.g., skilled wage labor in the core; sharecropping in the 
semiperiphery; and slavery or "coerced cash-crop labor" in the periphery). Economic 
rewards of these zones are differentially; in particular, core areas obtain and sustain 
a disproportionate surplus (Figure 2). Moreover, the economic structure of each 
region supports a dominant class oriented towards the world market and nations of 
certain strength operate in the interests of that dominant class. According to 
Wallerstein (1974), the differential strength of multiple states within world capitalist 
economy is crucial for maintaining the stability of overall system. In this context, the 
 
1cf., Coccia, 2005a, 2015b, 2016, 2017b, 2018e, 2018f. 
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strong nations reinforce and increase the differential flow of surplus from periphery 
to the core zone because they can provide "extra-economic" assistance to allow their 
capitalist classes to manipulate and enforce trade in their favor on world market 
(Skocpol, 1977, pp.1076-77).  
This Wallerstein's model of the world capitalist system is based on a two-step 
reduction: first, a reduction of socioeconomic structure to determination by world 
market opportunities and technological production possibilities; and second, a 
reduction of state structures and policies to determination by dominant class 
interests.  
The first reduction is based on the mode of labor control adopted in each region 
by dominant classes oriented to world market. Wallerstein (1974) argues that 
dominant classes choose freely among alternative strategies of labor control by 
assessing rationally the best means for maximizing profits, given the geographical, 
demographic, technological, and labor-skill conditions in which they operate, and 
given the profitable possibilities they face for selling particular products on the world 
market. Wallerstein (1974) treats "labor control" primarily as a market-optimizing 
strategy of dominant classes. Moreover, the forces of marketplace maintain 
established differences of occupational structure among regions: "a capitalist world-
economy essentially rewards accumulated capital, including human capital, at a 
higher rate than 'raw' labor power” (Wallenstein, 1974, p.350). Wallerstein (1974, 
p.401, original emphasis) also argues that: "Once we get a difference in the strength 
of the state-machineries, we get the operation of 'unequal exchange' which is 
enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus 
capitalism involves not only appropriation of surplus-value by an owner from a 
laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas".  
The second reduction of the Wallerstein's model is that differences of strength 
and policies among states located in different zones of the world system are 
explained as the result of differences in regional rates of surplus appropriation and, 
especially, as the expressions of different world market interests of the dominant 
classes within national political areas (Wallenstein, 1974, chap. 3, passim). On the 
one hand, the dominant capitalist classes want state protection for industry and their 
control of international trade; on the other hand, the periphery has weak states and 
dominant capitalist classes are interested in profiting from direct dealings with 
merchants of core areas. The functioning of the world system is that if states were 
equally strong (or potentially equally strong across the major regions): "they would 
be in the position of blocking the effective operation of transnational economic 
entities whose locus were in another state. It would then follow that the world 
division of labor would be impeded, the world-economy decline, and eventually the 
world- system fall apart" (Wallenstein, 1974, p.355).  
In brief, mechanisms of world system are directly or indirectly an expression of 
capitalist class interests that reshape institutions and their relations to satisfy their 
world market opportunities. Moreover, although dominant capitalist classes 
maximize their world market trading advantages, only the core-area capitalists want, 
need, and get the extra-economic assistance of strong states, while peripheral 
capitalists do not. 
Wallerstein's theory can explain patterns of economic development in early 
modern Europe, whereas it does not clarify the patterns of development of absolute 
monarchies. In fact, once capitalist relations of production and accumulation were 
firmly established in England, the European states ensured that capitalist relations 
would spread both across Europe and over the entire globe through state initiatives 
by competing powers and through military conquests, as well as through market 
expansion. To put differently, according to this theory: "In the core states there 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 5(4), M. Coccia, p.459-465. 
463 
463 
evolved relatively strong State systems, with an absolute monarch and a patrimonial 
State bureaucracy working primarily for this monarch. The venality of office and the 
development of standing armies based on mercenaries were the critical elements in 
the establishment of such a bureaucracy" (Wallenstein 1972, p.96). In general, the 
historical evidence does not fit the overall pattern implied by Wallenstein (1974). 
Moreover, economic division of labor within Wallerstein's theory (1974, pp.354-55) 
cannot be hold together as a "system" and the differential flow of surplus to the core 
is likely to be disrupted in later stages of world capitalist development. 
 
3. Conclusive observations 
Brenner (1976) shows that markets cannot primarily explain social-structural 
transformations or economic developments because, depending on preexisting 
institutional patterns of class relations, different classes may be in the best position 
to take advantage of available trade opportunities and thereby they have their 
particular positions strengthened. Although Wallerstein (1974) asserts that the world 
system is dynamic, he does not provide a theoretical explanation of why 
developmental processes occur. 
The only definite dynamics of the Wallerstein's world capitalist system is market 
processes: commercial growth, worldwide recessions, and the spread of trade in 
necessities to new regions of the globe. According to Skocpol (1977), although the 
global expansion depends on the emergence and diffusion of major technological 
innovations (Coccia, 2014, 2017, 2018), it is unexplained by Wallenstein (1972, 
1974). 
Moreover, the differential appearance of absolutist states in early modern Europe 
and their effects upon economic development are not adequately explained by 
Wallerstein's theory of world capitalist system. Patterns of state development are 
better explained by Anderson (1974) and Tilly (1975). These scholars suggest that, 
although no monocausal explanation of state building is possible, two sets of 
variables can clarify relations. Firstly, internal class structures were important 
because created different possibilities for monarchs to extract resources and 
encouraged them to use available resources in different ways. Secondly, 
transnational structures were important, including the networks of trade and 
economic interdependence to which Wallerstein points. In this context, other factors 
supporting the development of core and periphery regions that deserve to be 
investigated in this theoretical framework are education and higher education 
systems, low corruption, low criminality, high democracy, good economic 
governance, high innovative outputs, etc. (Coccia, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2014, 2014a, 
2014b, 2014c, 2017, 2017a, 2018a-l). To conclude, Wallerstein (1972, 1974) has 
given imperfect answers about the historical development of capitalism. However, 
the proposed theory has raised important socioeconomic issues for future challenges 
of a comprehensive theory of development.  
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